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THE CONSTITUTION ON THE DEFENSIVE.
BY HOMER HOYT.
I.
A WRITERS in the September number of The Open Court voicesa kind of dissatisfaction with the Constitution of the United
States that is receiving more attention now than ever before. It
is characteristic of the thought of an age of rapid scientific progress
to approach to the inner shrine which shields our most sacred in-
stitutions and to demand that those very articles of faith be sub-
jected to the impartial testing of the scientific laboratory. No longer
are we content to accept basic institutions upon faith alone. The
value of the Constitution of the United States must be tested, not
by its original purpose and results, not by its antiquity, and not by
the benefits it confers u])on a few, but by its present service to
democracy. If the Constitution was designed to protect the special
interests of an autocracy of wealth, and if its purpose throughout
its long history has been to raise the few into power by the sacrifices
of the many, then no reverence for its antiquity, and no sentimental
regard for its patriotic origin should deter us from abolishing it.
If the Constitution "has fostered corruption, graft and exploitation"-
we should strip it of authority until it has no more power in our
national counsels than the traditional scrap of paper, and the final
sentence rendered against it should be all the more severe because it
has so long imposed upon us by assuming the guise of a sacred and
patriotic institution.
The attack on the Constitution does not stop with the charge
of corruption. Ancillary to this main indictment is a charge which
is sometimes made the basis of an independent indictment and some-
times the cause of the main indictment, but which invariably ac-
companies the cry of "corruption" and "special interests." This
charge is made by the writer previously referred to when she says
that the Constitution binds us to the customs and habits that existed
in 1787. It is probable that she regards conservatism as an evil
per se in this restless age of changing fashions and changing laws.
It is certain that she regards the conservatism maintained by the
Constitution as the chief means by which it produces an unjust
result to-day, because the Constitution has thus perpetuated the in-
1 Mrs. Lida Parce.
- Mrs. Lida Parce, "Democracy and tlie Constitution," Open Couvt, Sept.,
1917, Vol. XXXI, p. 560.
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justice which she thinks entered into its formulation. The issue
is thus raised as to whether or not there is any merit in an iron
law that never changes. We must also bring to the fore another
issue that lies back of that, namely whether or not the Constitution
is an iron law that never changes.
These charges against the Constitution cut deep and no swift
or biased judgment should be ])assed. So serious an indictment
must be considered in all its aspects. The Constitution is so deeply
imbedded in our national life that it affects almost the whole range
of our social relationships. In order to make a decision upon the
charges against the Constitution, we must consider whether its good
qualities outweigh the bad. This kind of an assay is no easy task,
because we are not all agreed upon what constitutes pure social
gold. Only a study of economic, political, psychological and socio-
logical factors that are intertwined in the complex grouping we
call society can throw light upon this problem. Manifestly it is by
far too large a problem to be considered in the scope of this paper.
The writer can only muster some facts within the circle of his
acquaintanceship for the purpose of defending the Constitution at
the points of attack.
n.
Upon three questions part of the battle between the defenders
and challengers of the Constitution must be fought. These three
questions are : First, whether or not the Constitution fosters graft
and corruption ; second, whether or not there is any value in the
unchanging character of the Constitution ; and third, whether or not
the Constitution is in fact an unchanging organ of government.
These three points of controversy by no means indicate the whole
contour of the battle line, but they do seem to be stategic points.
The writer would therefore like to direct the attention of the reader
to the forces that may be mobilized to support the defenders of the
Constitution.
It must be frankly admitted at the outset that there is a cause
for the dissatisfaction which has thus been expressed against the
Constitution. That cause is undoubtedly a tendency of recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to strengthen the
position of the propertied classes in their struggle with the laboring
classes. 1lie writer feels a strong sympathy with the movements
for the minimum wage for women, for the shorter working day,
for sanitary regulations in factories, for the abolition of the com-
pany store, and for the various measures designed to safeguard the
interests of trade imions and thereljy iiicrease the l)argaining power
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of labor, but he does not believe that the most serious impediment
to the enactment of these reforms is the Constitution of the United
States. Admitting that there is an evil to be remedied, the writer
believes that there is not sufficient evidence to hold the Constitution
responsible for that evil. C)n the contrary it is submitted that the
forces in the Constitution which are the most maligned are in fact
productive of much good. This brings us directly to a considera-
tion of the points of controversy.
We are told first that the Constitution serves special privileges
and that it is a bulwark of vested wrongs. The charge is not spe-
cific, and the answer can therefore only meet the prevalent types
of discontent which "special privilege" suggests.
The Constitution has always had a very special regard for the
vested rights of property. It has shown its solicitude for the in-
terests of the owners of property by throwing up bulwarks to pro-
tect them against the arbitrary forfeiture or seizure of private
property without just compensation. The protection of the special
interests of property however is not usually regarded as unworthy
of a democracy unless there is discrimination in the treatment of
various persons holding property. The Constitution guards the
interests of the owner of the humble cottage as zealously as the
lord of a mansion on Sheridan Road or Riverside Drive. The value
to our civilization by the protection of property rights per se can
best be seen by comparing conditions in countries with shifting
constitutions like Mexico with the conditions that obtain in coun-
tries where the right of property is regarded as fundamental.
Perhaps the critics of the Constitution have another thing in
mind, however, w\rtv\ they attack the Constitution for protecting
special interests. Perhaps they refer to the conflict between the
property interests of a few capitalists and the health, morals and
general welfare of the many laborers. In spite of our ethical scheme
of values in which we regard life as worth more than meat, and
the welfare and happiness of a people worth more than material
wealth, it is asserted that the Constitution places property above
llie health, morals and even the life of the individual laborer. In
truth, however, there is ample authority in the Constitution for
sacrificing property interests to the interests of morals, health and
life, and this authority has been frequently exercised. Of course
there must be a balancing not only between absolute property rights
and absolute rights of health and happiness, but between various
amounts of property rights and various amounts of health rights.
A great projjerty interest should not be destroyed to protect a very
THE CONSTITUTION ON THE DEFENSIVE. 37
small health right. The ui)])cr stories of a sky-scraper should not
be torn oil merely to decrease the danger of hrc. It is significant,
however, to note that the Supreme Court has refused to allow
equal property interests to stand above ecjual health interests when
it clearly saw the issue. It may be that the Supreme Court has not
gone far enough. It is probable that the members of that body have
not comprehended the connection between the health and happiness
of workers and the measures designed to secure those results. They
may not have made enough allowance for the increasing com-
plexity of industrial society, whereby the result of legislation con-
ducts itself through many channels before it reaches its intended
destination. They may have overlooked the growing interdepend-
ency of the human family whereby the good or evil that is brought
to bear against one man communicates itself by a series of widening
circles to the whole of society. ^lany social workers are feeling
that the property rights should give the right of way to the broader
human rights on all occasions, and that property rights should be
forced to yield not only when they conflict directly with the interest
of health, morals and life, l:)ut also when they conflict with any
legislation which indirectly or by roundabout means promotes health,
morals and life. It is not the fault of the Constitution, however,
that the judicial reaction toward social legislation has been rather
narrow, because it is not unconstitutional to confiscate property
when it is being used for a purpose that is detrimental to health
and morals.
It is probable that the critics of the Constitution have still
another conception in mind when they charge the Constitution with
fostering special interests. They would hold the Constitution re-
sponsible for permitting if not actuallv encouraging the growing
concentration of wealth into the hands of a few. Admitting that
the establishment of an aristocracy of wealth is a serious evil under
any form of government, it still remains to be seen whether the
Constitution is the cause of the widening gulf between the rich and
the poor. It is true that the Constitution has prevented and will
continue to prevent the breaking up of large fortunes by confisca-
tion. It has stood guard over the property of millionaires who have
plundered the people when the people in turn would have plundered
the millionaires. In thus j)rotecting the \ested interests of the few.
not for the sake of the particular ])ersons who happened to own the
vested interests, but for the sake of the institution of private
property, the Constitution has saved us from evils far worse than
those which we sought to cure. It has saved us from the repetition
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of the shock to credit that resuhed from wild-cat banking and the
repudiation of state bonds. It has saved us from the disorders and
demoraHzation that followed the sudden forfeiture of crown lands
in Russia. It has sa\ed us from the panic and utter collapse of our
whole financial structure that rests upon the security of property
rights. It must be remembered too that this panic would be felt
all the more severely because of the delicacy of the parts that bind
our financial machinery together.
The Constitutional guaranty of property rights has been of
great importance to our nation, because it is founded upon prin-
ciples of justice to the individual. Property originally acquired
wrongfully soon becomes divested of its evil character and it is
then unjust to restore the status quo that existed before the wrong
was committed. The gain of robbery, fraud and oppression soon
mingles with the stream of property produced by honest efifort and
loses its identity completely. That part of the value of a share of
stock that is due to railroad rebates cannot be distinguished from
the part of value that is due to honest production. The purchaser
of the stock on the market parts with money that is usually earned
by honest elTort, and to confiscate the \alue due to railroad rebates
would be a monstrous injustice to him. The old saying that two
wrongs cannot make a right applies here with great force. The
cure for the e\il of vested interests lies not in the confiscation of
property, for that would be akin to burning down a house in order
to disinfect it. The only just method is to prevent the proceeds
of graft extortion and monopoly from ever becoming property in
the first place by striking directly at the evil practices themselves.
By prohibiting the evil practices of unfair competition, railroad re-
bates, price discrimination, franchise grabbing, legislative lobbying
and all the other hydra-headed forms in which graft displays itself,
we would prevent the canker of corruption from ever becoming a
\ested right of property. We would apply the policy of locking
our barn before the horse is stolen, instead of leaving the door open
and protecting ourselves after the catastrophe by stealing a horse
from a malefactor of great wealth to replace the horse that was
stolen from us.
Probably the critics of the Constitution have many other rea-
sons not here ad\ertcd to for believing that it is a fortress of special
jjrivilege. If so, they owe it to their cause to reveal the secret of
their discontent. Their specific proof has failed to disclose any
basis for an indictment against the Constitution as a traitor to the
general welfare.
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• III.
The second serious indictment against the Constitution is based
on the assumption that it has not changed since the days of our
grandfathers and proceeds to expound the evils of adopting the
mummy of the eighteenth century as a model for the life of to-day.
Without admitting the whole charge that the Constitution has not
changed, the apologist for the Constitution insists that some elements
of our modern life should be patterned after the days of old and
that any considerable change in these elements is not desirable.
The apologist refers particularly to the necessity of maintaining the
stability of property rights.
There is every reason for maintaining stability of property
rights. The chief incentive to thrift is the prospect of an assured
income from property. The stimulus to the undertaking of a new
enterprise consists in the probability of profit from the venture.
The business man balances the risk against the prospective profit,
and if the risk is great compared with the expected profit, he will
not extend his i)lant or start a new business. The greatest of all
possible risks is the risk of losing the whole of the principal as well
as the interest through capricious changes in the laws of private
property. Society progresses through the action of individuals
striking out into new fields of endeavor, and hence it is to the
interest of society to stimulate and not discourage individual initia-
tive. The chief spur to progress is the knowledge that property
rights will remain stable.
Even as it is economical so also is it just to maintain the stability
of property rights. An individual who has labored long to accjuire
property would surely have a grievance if he was suddenly divested
of his title because of a changed rule of law. The only way to
assure a man that he will be allowed to enjoy what he has bargained
and paid for is to make the laws governing tlic title to property as
uniform and stable as possible.
Stability is a virtue in more ways than one. The stability of
the Constitution is of inestimable importance in protecting the rights
of a minority when they are threatened by the brute strength of
a majority. When gusts of popular passion dominate the sentiment
of one locality or e\en of one state, the objects of public disfavor
can appeal to the broader principles of right and justice guaranteed
by the Constitution. When even the whole nation becomes stirred
with wrath and in a moment of forgetfulness would do something
for which it would afterward be ashamed, the Constitution holds
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up a warning hand. Thus a minority, whether it be composed of
an unpopular race, an unpopular rehgion, or unpopular business
interests, has found a refuge against the rage of the mob. The Con-
stitution has brought to bear a force for the protection of life,
liberty and property that the furious power of a temporary majority
could not beat down. However much the majority has been momen-
tarily exasperated by the steadiness with which the Constitution has
resisted its purpose, in many cases its members have later honored
the instrument that restrained them. When there was a real griev-
ance against the Constitution, its very stability compelled a clear
statement of the reason and necessity for its amendment. It did not
give way to the first wild rush, and hence the Constitution has
blocked hasty legislation, the mass of which has been a plague to
this country. The Constitution has thus been more than a scrap of
paper in the past when the changing current of public opinion has
left its channel, and if our nation in the future is ever swept along
l)y a ])owerful jxsychology that threatens to overturn individual
rights, the Constitution will doubtless again prove to be a precious
instrument.
IV.
Although the Constitution is essentially stable, it is by no
means as hard to change as most of its critics believe. In addition
to the process of external amendment there is a process of internal
adaptation that is no less dynamic because it is not heralded by the
clamor of debate and the roar of the cannon. Notwithstanding
the common belief that the whole constitutional law of the United
States is to be found in the original document itself, in fact our
Constitution to-day consists of a library of bulky volumes. Not to
mention the thousands of cases in the lower federal courts, the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States alone fill 250
large books. The celebrated words and phrases of the Constitution
have been so interlined, amended, interpreted, expanded, and an-
notated by the courts of the United States, that even a magician
might be astounded to see so many twentieth-century products
drawn out of an old beaver hat of the eighteenth century. The
process of judicial interpretation is entirely different from the
process of casting plastic material into an iron mold. The rules of
the Constitution are not drawn tightly over each detail of conduct,
but they are broad and loose, giving opportunity for fresh definition
and specific application in thousands of concrete cases. The law
laid down by the Constitution was confined to principles which
centuries of experience had demonstrated to be universal in scope
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and therefore least subject to change. Thus the constitutional
phrase "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce" was
framed in the days of the stage coach, yet it has been extended to
meet the needs of the steamboat, the railroad, the telephone, the
telegraph, the wireless and the aeroplane. It was conceived at a
time when transportation was regarded as a private enterprise, it
has lived to see transportation brought within the domain of public
regulation, and it will be ade(|uate for the needs of public owner-
ship if that ever becomes necessary.
Some clauses in the Constitution are purposely elastic. Phrases
like "due process of law" and "cruel and unusual punishment" adapt
themselves to the views of each successive age. The right of every
man to be tried according to "due process of law" does not require
that he be tried according to the conceptions of due process that
pre^•ailed in the eighteenth century. On the contrary it guarantees
to the citizen all the protection of modern notions of a fair hearing
in addition to those essentials of a fair hearing that have existed
since the days of the Magna Charta. Similarly with the constitu-
tional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment." Manifestly
what one age would regard as ordinary punishment, another would
regard as cruel and unusual. The fundamental change in our theory
of punishment as witnesssed by the movements for prison reform
and the psychological study of crime demonstrates that the social
attitude on these matters progresses from one age to another. The
Constitution accepts this fact of change and allows the average
ethical standards of the time to judge whether a given kind of pun-
ishment is "cruel and unusual" or not.
In addition to all the elasticity provided for by the terms of the
Constitution, there is a rule of interpretation which gives still greater
leeway for progress. This rule was stated by Chief Justice Marshall
in the famous case of McCulloch ^•s. Maryland. In referring to a
situation not expressly covered by any language in the Constitution
he said: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but are consistent
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
By this principle, which has been subsequently followed, the people
are not hampered by obsolete machinery when they seek to attain
an end that is clearly within the spirit of the Constitution. They
can devise new methods for meeting new problems. The Constitu-
tion is thus a living instrument which is responsive to the needs
and wishes of each successixe age.
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The same liberality of spirit is shown toward social legislation.
The Constitution does not attempt to make each legislative act fit
into an iron bed of Procrustes, but it only sets up broad limits be-
yond which the legislature may not stray. These limits are not
absolutely rigid. There is a twilight zone or No-man's land where
the legislative power meets the restraining hand of the Constitution.
A broad interpretation of the Constitution would extend the legis-
lative power over most of this disputed ground ; a narrow inter-
pretation of the Constitution would drive it back. The gains that
might be made for social legislation on this border line would be
sufficient to meet the needs of progress. That these gains have not
been made is due to a conservative attitude on the part of the judges
of the Supreme Court and not to the Constitution itself. The mem-
bers of the Supreme Court who have felt the pressure of the public
opinion of this age have been willing to grant as much power to
the laboring masses as it would be wise to give at present. The
judges who have declared social legislation unconstitutional because
they did not appreciate its significance would probably emasculate
an amendment to the Constitution covering the same subject-matter.
The problem lies deeper than any form of words. It consists of
the lack of understanding of modern industrial relationships. That
problem cannot be solved by a recall of the Constitution nor even
by a recall of judges, but as Roscoe Pound suggests only by a
recall of law professors and much of the judicial thinking of the
past generation.^
The writer does not believe that the Constitution is without
faults. There is need for some reforms. Such reforms, however,
must be based not only upon a thorough analysis of our industrial
situation, but also upon a thorough knowledge of the Constitution,
because we cannot reform either unless we understand them thor-
oughly. Before we invoke the cumbersome process of amendment,
we should also understand what is the most that could be accom-
plished without amendment. Before we relegate the Constitution
to the limbo of historical documents, we should be sure that our
new Magna Charta does not leave us as helpless as of old. The
sudden uprooting of a long-cherished ideal w^ould undoubtedly dis-
turb our whole social structure and bring about a panic even in
quarters where there was no cause for a panic. The element of
morale is a factor in our national life that must be reckoned with,
1 "Social Prol)lems and the Courts." American Journal of Sociology (1912),
Vol. XVIII, pp. 331-341. Also cited in W. H. Hamilton, Current Economic
Problems (1915). pp. 651-653.
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however, and it is folly to frighten jjeople when notliing is to be
gained by it. The snl)stitution of new and tmtried maxims of
government for those which ha\e been defined by a process of
court decision might vevy well complicate instead of simplifying our
legal problems. L'nless we are sure that we have something better
we may well hesitate to throw overboard the results of one hundred
and thirty years of judicial experience. In changing constitutions
our motto should be "Safetv first."
AN AUTONOMOITS UKRAINE.
RY AN UKRAINIAN.
WHEN in 1863 a Russian minister of state declared that "there
never has been and never will be an Ukrainian language or
nationality." he did not foresee the tragedy of the last Romanoff
and the a])parently accomplished disintegration of the empire of
the Czars. In point of fact the Aery arrogance of his utterance was
but a reflex of that will to conquer which has characterized the
house of RomanotT from the time when it first took control of
Great, or better. IMuscovite Russia and added one subjected people
after another as jewels to its crown. Among these was a former
nation once of great power, later an object of contention between
medieval Poland and Muscovy until in 1654 a political blunder on
the part of its ruler, the Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki, put this
wealthy but politically weak state first under Muscovite tutelage
but later under the conqueror's heel of the Czars, so that it preceded
its enemy Poland which fell a A'ictim over a century later.
For one hundred and fifty }ears the wrongs of Poland have
aroused and obtained the sympathies of the non-Russian world,
but rarely has the voice of justice been raised in behalf of a people
whose only crime has been the misfortune of its undefended geo-
graphical situation between rapacious neighbors. The English world
has forgotten the stirring Ma.ccppa of its greatest nineteenth-century
poet. Lord Byron, and the }:)resent political situation will hardly
allow any Englishman to take up the pen in defense of a nation
whose rebellion seems to jeopardize the cause of the Entente by
weakening the aggressive strength of Russia against her enemies
of Central Europe. But putting aside the question of abstract
justice, is such a stand even ])olitically expedient? Cannot the aims
of the new L'krainian nation be utilized to the advantage of a
strong Russia, so as to make her a potent force once more in the
